Gerecht EU: Herinschrijving Waterdrop-merk te kwader trouw wegens omzeiling gebruiksbewijsplicht

Gerecht EU 21 oktober 2026, IEF 23968; IEFbe 4371; T-541/25; ECLI:EU:T:2026:687 (Qingdao Ecopure Filter tegen EUIPO, Waterdrop Microdrink). In deze zaak tussen Qingdao Ecopure Filter en EUIPO, met Waterdrop Microdrink als interveniënte, staat de vraag centraal of de herinschrijving van het merk Waterdrop te kwader trouw heeft plaatsgevonden in de zin van artikel 59 lid 1 onder b UMVo. Qingdao Ecopure Filter had in 2021 een aanvraag ingediend voor het woordmerk Waterdrop, terwijl zij al beschikte over een vrijwel identiek ouder beeldmerk voor onder meer waterfilters. Waterdrop Microdrink verzocht om nietigverklaring van het nieuwe merk. De kamer van beroep van het EUIPO oordeelde dat de herinschrijving voor bepaalde waren te kwader trouw had plaatsgevonden, omdat daarmee de verplichting om normaal gebruik van het oudere merk aan te tonen werd omzeild. Qingdao Ecopure Filter stelde hiertegen beroep in.

Het Gerecht bevestigt het oordeel van de kamer van beroep. Daarbij is van belang dat het nieuwe merk slechts vier maanden na het verstrijken van de gebruikstermijn van het oudere merk werd aangevraagd en betrekking had op waren die reeds door het oudere merk werden beschermd. Ook had de merkhouder meerdere vrijwel identieke merkaanvragen ingediend zonder daarvoor een overtuigende commerciële rechtvaardiging aan te tonen. Het Gerecht benadrukt dat herinschrijving van een merk op zichzelf geen kwade trouw oplevert, maar dat hiervan wel sprake kan zijn wanneer de merkhouder daarmee bewust probeert de verplichting tot het aantonen van normaal gebruik te omzeilen. De door Qingdao Ecopure Filter aangevoerde redenen, waaronder modernisering van het merk, aanpassing van de warenlijst en vermindering van administratieve lasten, rechtvaardigen de herinschrijving volgens het Gerecht niet. Bovendien had de merkhouder het nieuwe merk gebruikt in oppositieprocedures tegen merkaanvragen van Waterdrop Microdrink, waardoor zij profiteerde van een nieuwe periode waarin geen gebruiksbewijs hoefde te worden geleverd. Of de merkhouder het normale gebruik van het oudere merk daadwerkelijk had kunnen aantonen, is daarbij niet relevant. Doorslaggevend is de bedoeling waarmee de nieuwe merkaanvraag werd ingediend. Het Gerecht oordeelt dat de herinschrijving voor de betrokken waren te kwader trouw heeft plaatsgevonden en verwerpt het beroep.

44      In the second place, the applicant submits that the Board of Appeal incorrectly applied to the present case paragraph 70 of the judgment of 21 April 2021, MONOPOLY (T‑663/19, EU:T:2021:211), according to which the re-filing of a mark does not, in itself, amount to a filing made in bad faith. It should be noted, in that regard, that it is clear from the Board of Appeal’s reasoning, as summarised in paragraphs 37 to 42 above, that it was not the re-filing of an EU trade mark in itself which was found to be indicative of bad faith on the part of the applicant. By contrast, the Board of Appeal, after having examined the information in the case file as a whole, in the light of the case-law cited in paragraph 31 above, concluded that it demonstrated that the applicant had intentionally sought to circumvent a fundamental rule of EU trade mark law, namely that relating to proof of use, in order to derive an advantage therefrom to the detriment of the balance of the EU trade mark system established by the EU legislature. Consequently, that argument put forward by the applicant must be rejected.

78      In that regard, in accordance with the case-law set out in paragraphs 26 to 31 above, it is sufficient to note that whether or not the applicant could have actually proved genuine use of the earlier mark is irrelevant, as it is the intention of the applicant for a mark which is to be evaluated in the present dispute (judgment of 21 April 2021, MONOPOLY, T‑663/19, EU:T:2021:211, paragraph 82).

82      First, it should be noted that the Board of Appeal carried out an assessment of the applicant’s practices and relied on specific facts, namely (i) that at least two opposition proceedings brought by the applicant against the intervener’s WATERDROP marks were based on the contested mark and therefore benefited from a new grace period and (ii) that the applicant had relied on the earlier mark only in the opposition proceedings brought in Spain (see paragraph 41 above). In those circumstances, the Board of Appeal correctly concluded that the applicant was able to derive a procedural advantage from its practices, by having avoided the need to prove use of the earlier mark covering identical goods. Therefore, the line of argument concerning the Board of Appeal’s alleged assumptions cannot succeed.

83      Secondly, it should be noted that the fact that four applications for registration of the intervener’s national WATERDROP marks, namely in the Czech Republic, in Germany, in Spain and in France, were the subject of opposition proceedings on the basis of the contested mark does not support a finding of honest use of that mark by the applicant. Rather, it appears that the applicant attempted to prevent the intervener from registering its signs in respect of identical goods. Therefore, contrary to the applicant’s contentions, it cannot be ruled out that the use of the contested mark was not intended for the purpose of engaging fairly in competition, but instead to undermine the intervener’s economic activities.

84      Thirdly, it must be noted that the applicant cannot complain that the Board of Appeal criticised the oppositions it had brought on the basis of the contested mark or other earlier rights in the Czech Republic, in Spain and in the European Union, given that the applications for the intervener’s WATERDROP marks related, inter alia, to goods in Class 11 which coincided with goods covered by the earlier mark. The Board of Appeal therefore correctly noted, in paragraph 68 of the contested decision, that such oppositions, based on marks other than the earlier mark which covered goods in Class 11, were, in essence, indicative of abusive conduct. On the contrary, as the Board of Appeal observed, the Court notes that it was logical for the applicant to rely on an earlier right other than the earlier mark in the opposition proceedings brought in France and in Germany. Those applications for the intervener’s marks concerned goods in Class 7 which were unrelated to the goods in Class 11 covered by the earlier mark. Therefore, the applicant’s arguments are based on a misreading of the contested decision.